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Abstract— A botnet, a set of compromised machines controlled 
distantly by an attacker, is the basis of numerous security threats 
around the world. Command and Control servers are the backbones 
of botnet communications, where the bots and botmasters send 
report and attack orders to each other. Botnets are also categorized 
according to their C&C protocols. A Domain Name System method 
known as Fast-Flux Service Network (FFSN) – a special type of 
botnet – has been engaged by bot herders to cover malicious botnet 
activities and increase the lifetime of malicious servers by quickly 
changing the IP addresses of the domain name over time. Although 
several methods have been suggested for detecting FFSNs, they 
have low detection accuracy especially with zero-day domain. In this 
research, we propose a new system called Fast Flux Killer System 
(FFKS) that has the ability to detect FF-Domains in online mode 
with an implementation constructed on Adaptive Dynamic evolving 
Spiking Neural Network (ADeSNN). The proposed system proved 
its ability to detect FF domains in online mode with high detection 
accuracy (98.77%) compare with other algorithms, with low false 
positive and negative rates respectively. It is also proved a high level 
of performance. Additionally, the proposed adaptation of the 
algorithm enhanced and helped in the parameters customization 
process.     
Keywords: Fast-Flux, dynamic evolving spiking neural network, 
ADeSNN, botnet detection. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
   Botnets comprising networks of compromised computers that 
are controlled remotely by attackers are the basis of numerous 
security threats, such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attacks, identity theft, phishing, and spam [1-3]. Fast flux 
networks (FFNs) are a special type of botnet being used by 
criminals in the same manner as those used in round-robin 
domain name systems (RRDNSs) and content distribution 
networks (CDNs) to offer high availability and flexibility for their 
malicious websites [1]. Botnet writers disguise their malicious 
activities and design new tactics and mechanisms to hide their 
communications. The core idea of FFNs is to use bot computers 
as proxies (flux agents) that forward user queries to backend 
servers called “motherships.” A recurrent and fast change in the 
IP addresses of proxies is essential to evade detection and a 
potential shut down and to ensure high availability to those 
backend servers. 
   The report of the Cost of Cyber-Crime Study [4] points out that 
the mean annualized cost of cyber-attacks for 252 benchmarked 
organizations is $7.7 million/year. The report also shows that 
these attacks are carried out with or supported by either a botnet 
or a web-based attack, and fast flux is used as evasion technique 
to provide availability and resiliency.  
   Dynamic evolving spiking neural network (DeSNN), that 
employ both rank order (RO) learning algorithm and dynamic 
synapses to learn spatial and temporal data in a fast and on-line 
mode. By employing both RO learning and Spike Driven 
Synaptic Plasticity SDSP, they will be discussed in details later 
in this paper. ADeSNN is constructed using two public published 
datasets, Fast Flux [5] and IRIS [6] datasets, respectively. The 
target in this paper is to show the proposed solution of the fast 
flux problem, prove that with the proposed modification on 
DeSNN the adaptive version shows promising results, and to 
minimize the number of the parameters needed to be set into the 
algorithm. 
   One of the core problems in botnet detection is the so-called 
unknown “zero-day” fast flux domain. Zero-day domains are 
defined as those related to bots (FF-agents) that are not 
blacklisted [7]. A fast flux attack is a complex evasive technique 
that cannot be identified by many current techniques because 
attackers can use new and previously unseen bots. A number of 
potential solutions to fast flux botnet attacks have been proposed, 
but these solutions are not yet effective. These solutions range 
from passive, active, to real-time approaches. The 
misclassification of malicious and legitimate domains increases 
with time, especially when dealing with unknown zero-day fast 
flux botnet domains. The rest of this proposal is arranged as 
follows. A problem of fast flux botnets are provided in Section 2. 
Research objectives are mentioned in section 3. The related work 
is presented in Section 4. The proposed solution is discussed in 
detail in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presenting the conclusion 
and the expected outcomes. 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
   Numerous studies have explored botnet detection, especially 
fast flux botnet detection. Most previous research discussed the 
detection of FFSNs or malicious fast flux domains, which serve 
as the main element of the fast flux botnet technique. The related 
 
 
 
works on fast flux argued about fast flux in terms of what is 
fluxed or what technique is used to detect an FF domain. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the present study is the 
first to investigate fast flux botnet approaches on the basis of the 
solution scope of detection techniques. In the present work, fast 
flux botnet approaches are classified according to the solution 
scope (Host-based, Router-based, and DNS-based methods). 
Moreover, the mode of each detection technique is discussed 
below and identified whether it is active, passive, or real time. 
A. Host-based detection methods 
   A detection system is applied to a host device or a set of devices 
from the user point of view. According to the previous work, the 
majority was a host-based detection approaches, these 
approaches are divided into three subsections: passive, active, 
and real-time approaches such as in [8, 9]. Fast flux detection 
requires a fast and accurate approach to identify malicious 
domains before they change their IP addresses. Thus, real-time 
approaches have been developed to increase the power of 
detection techniques. Real-time approaches could detect 
malicious domain names in most cases. However, the above-
mentioned techniques have certain limitations, which cast doubt 
on their results (accuracy, TP, TN, FP, and FN). We still lack a 
stable technique that can detect malicious domains, particularly 
zero-day domains, in an acceptable period of time with high 
detection accuracy.  
B.  Router-based detection methods 
   Various information extracted from network traffic to solve 
several network problems, generally and particularly for the fast 
-flux botnet problem. Network traffic comprises both DNS traffic 
and non-DNS traffic such in [10, 11] However, the speed and the 
large amount of data passing through the router cause problems 
to any proposed systems: high false rates based on the concept of 
a fast detection of FF botnets, memory problems (databases) with 
regard to handling large traffic data flows, and scalability 
problem. Therefore, detecting fast flux botnets and particularly 
zero-day domains at this part of the network is not an easy task. 
C.  DNS-based detection methods 
   Researchers studied DNS data traffic in their country of origin. 
Thus, their work focused on monitoring and analyzing DNS data 
traffic and detecting malicious activities, specifically fast flux 
activity. Some researchers employed passive, active, and real-
time approaches such as in [10, 12].  
   The detection systems initiated over a DNS server do not 
exhibit network time delays. Many researchers determined that 
systems that depend on DNS features cannot provide an accurate 
detection rate for fast flux domains [13]. 
   The main problem of fast flux botnet detection methods is 
detecting the evasion detection mechanism before the attack is 
initiated to support botnet malicious activities, particularly when 
detecting zero-day domains without any prior knowledge about 
the incoming domain name, which serves malicious websites/C2 
servers/ motherships. At the same time, detection accuracy and 
low detection error rates are monitored. On the basis of the 
developing strategies of attackers, the detection system should 
develop new systems that are long-lasting and adaptive to allow 
the future modification of their functions. As the proposed 
framework promises as one of the host-based methods. 
III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION  
   The expected system is an online detection system, and it's 
going to deal with real data so spiking neural network (SNN) is 
conducted. Systems based on SNN have already shown their 
ability in capturing spatial and temporal data. Adaptive Dynamic 
evolving Spiking Neural Network (ADeSNN), based on a one-
pass rank order (RO) learning rules and a scheme to evolve a new 
spiking neuron and connections, which lead to learning new 
patterns from arriving data. This paper introduces a new type of 
DeSNN, which employ both RO learning  and dynamic synapses 
to learn spatial and temporal data in a fast and on-line mode, 
however (in our proposed version the initial weight is replaced by 
the spiketime of the input record)for improving the learning 
process . By employing both RO learning and Spike Driven 
Synaptic Plasticity SDSP, ADeSNN could be used in 
unsupervised, supervised, or semi-supervised learning mode. The 
SDSP learning is used to dynamically update the connection 
weights of the network that capture data clusters both through 
training and through recall. 
 
݆߱, ݅ = ݏ݌݅݇݁ݐ݆݅݉݁, ݅            (1)  
   After initiation of the weight on the synapses of j neuron based 
on the spiketime matrix of that input record as in formula (1), the 
dynamic synapses adjust their weights based on the SDSP 
algorithm. While the spikes arrive at any time t then its value 
increases, as there is no spikes arrive at this time its value 
decreases: 
   ∆݆߱, ݅(ݐ) = ݆݁(ݐ). ܦ              (2)  
   Where ej(t) equals to 1, if there is a sequenced spike timely t 
arrives at synapse j at the time of arriving the learning patterns 
at the output neuron i, and its equals to (-1) otherwise. D is the 
drift parameter, which is able to be changed for up or down 
drifts. 
   In parallel, all synapses change their values in every time t 
unit, while the input patterns Pi arrive at the output neuron i. 
based on this values which may go up or down, the synapses 
altogether of the neuron could capture nearly relationships of 
spike timing through the learned pattern. Continuously, as the 
incoming training patterns arrive (input spikes on different 
synapses), they are encoded within the time window T. Which 
then the threshold Thi of the neuron defined. Based on the 
value of this threshold the neuron i spikes or not. The threshold 
is defined as a fraction of the entire PSPi (PSPimax) collected 
through the appearance of the Entire input pattern 
 
ܲܵܲ݅݉ܽݔ = ∑ ∑ ݂݆(ݐ). ݆߱, ݅(ݐ)௝ୀଵ,ଶ,…,ெ௧ୀଵ,ଶ,…,்     (3)  
ܶℎ݅ = ܥ. ܲܵܲ݅݉ܽݔ                    (4) 
 
Where: T is the time window in which the input patterns 
arrived, M is the number of neurons I input synapses, ݂݆(ݐ) 
equals to 1 if the spike appears in time window at the synapse 
j for this input pattern, if not it equals to 0. ݆߱, ݅(ݐ) is the 
 
 
 
efficacy of the dynamic synapse between the neurons j,i which 
calculated in equation (2). 
   Fig.1 shows the architecture of the ADeSNN algorithm, also 
positions the rank order encoding method based on multiple 
Gaussian receptive fields. In addition, the figure presents the 
SDSP learning rule, which adjusts the synapses weights, these 
weights change up /down based on the drift parameter value, 
which discussed before.   
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Fig. 1 the flowchart of the ADeSNN architecture 
IV. DATASET 
   The proposed ADeSNN method evaluated and tested using 
two datasets. Firstly, a public fast flux dataset is chosen [14], 
which used in [15], and the majority of the real-time and active 
approaches used the same sources [8, 13]. This dataset consists 
of DNS responses of labeled domain names as benign and fast 
flux. The benign domains are selected and labeled based on the 
source of the top trusted websites like Alexa, top blogs as Blogs 
on Top "BOT". While the fast-flux domains are collected from 
the famous fast flux blacklisted websites such as ATLAS, 
DNSBL and FluXOR (information security expert's detection 
systems). This dataset is conducted to test the proposed system 
efficiency of detecting fast flux domains. Besides, the dataset 
found as a response of the DNS server answers. So, a script of 
python is written for feature extraction and analysis. 
   Secondly, the public IRIS dataset, which consists of 3 classes 
each with 50 instances, this dataset is the best known dataset for 
pattern recognition. One class is linearly separable from the 
other two, but the latter two classes are not separable from each 
other. The IRIS dataset has 4 features which are (sepal length, 
sepal width, petal length, and petal width), this data is used in 
order to prove that the ADeSNN shows better classification 
result than the DeSNN itself. 
V. FEATURE SET   
   The first stage at the proposed solution is the feature extraction. 
A well-built fast flux botnet detection method should distinguish 
between a legitimate and malicious network (domain). On the 
other side, a well-built Fast Flux Network (FFN) seems like a 
benign CDN, by returning a records that belong to the same close 
geographic areas. This leads the detection systems that depend 
on IP address features to misclassify those types of well-built 
FFN as benign CDNs. In addition, the FFN developers are trying 
to change the characteristics of the fast flux Network to evade 
detection, even if this modification is reflected in the 
performance of the FFN. Therefore, a new detection system 
should rely on features belonging to the FFN itself, as these 
features are not prone to change quickly.   
   Based on the current chosen dataset, some of the features used 
in the proposed solution are used before in related works, 
moreover, new features are suggested to improve the accuracy 
of classifying the fast flux and benign domains. Table 1 shows 
the selected features set of the first dataset: 
TABLE 1 SELECTED FEATURES SET 
Feature Description New 
feature 
IPans Number of IP addresses 
in the answer section 
- 
NSadd Number of IP addresses 
in the additional section 
- 
NASN_ans Number of ASN for the 
IP addresses of the 
answer section 
- 
NASN_add Number of ASN for the 
IP addresses of the 
additional section 
- 
AVGSIM The average of similarity 
of the ASN  
√ 
Qtime Time of the query √ 
Msgs Message size √ 
 
   The majority of the chosen features are known, but the 
following feature is new; AVGSIM which refers to the average 
of the similarity between the autonomous system number of the 
user's IP himself and autonomous system numbers of the proxy 
bots (compromised computers) returned in the answer section of 
the DNS response, and is computed according to the formula (5) 
[16]: 
(5) 
   It could be said that xμ and yδ are significantly similar if 
M(xμ,yδ) ≥ ½, which means that the bigger value refers to high 
similarity between the two variables (vectors). Based on this 
measure, the similarity among the new input and the trained 
samples to find the close-trained input that matches the new one. 
The other two new features are the time of the query and the 
DNS packet size. The feature set of the second dataset is 
mentioned above in the dataset section. 
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION 
   The software and hardware used in those experiment were 
based on Linux mint operating system rum core i7 7500U CPU, 
16GB RAM, a simulations of the compared method were 
conducted using Matlab 8.5 and Python 2.7 environments. Two 
experiments are conducted in this paper; the former is based on 
the first dataset- fast flux dataset. This experiment showed the 
ability of the proposed system to detect the fast flux domains. 
Each record contains the selected feature set that helps to identify 
each class. Fast flux dataset contains (1710) instances, while the 
 
 
 
benign dataset contains (1790) instances. 3-flod cross-validation 
is used to do 3 experiments, then the average has been taken, all 
the results and discussions are presented below. In addition, the 
two related classifiers (Linear decision function, and C4.5) were 
been compared with the proposed algorithm to present the 
advantages over the related work. 
   Due to evaluate the proposed algorithm various detection 
accuracy measures are conducted (true positive rate TPR, true 
negative rate TNR, false positive rate FPR, false negative rate 
FNR, area under rock-curve AUC, and F-measure), and the 
results of these measures are presented in the table 2 and 2 to 
Shows the accuracy measures of the detection of the proposed 
and the other two algorithms (Linear decision function, C4.5, 
and DeSNN) 
TABLE 2 COMPARISON RESULTS OF THE FIRST EXPERIMENT 
 C4.5 Linear ADeSNN 
FNR 0.069869 0.0393013 0 
FPR 0.0533333 0.0533333 0.0240964 
TPR 0.930131 0.9606987 1 
TNR 0.9466667 0.9466667 0.9759036 
AUC 0.9383988 0.9536827 0.9879518 
F-measure 0.938326 0.9544469 0.9875 
 
   According to Lin et al.[7] a genetic approach was proposed 
as a real-time detection solution of the fast flux domains 
problem. This method suggested two-detection feature to 
classify the benign and the flux domains. Firstly, entropy of the 
domain name (E-DPN) of the preceding node of the flux node 
(flux-agent), by using the traceroute of all the returned IPs 
from the DNS response. Of course, if the E-DPN is high the 
most probably the domain classified as benign otherwise 
classified as fluxed.  
   Secondly, the Standard Deviation of Round Trip Time (SD-
RTT) between the user and all the return IPs of the flux-agents, 
so assumed that the scatter flux-agent with is going to produce 
a high value of the SD-RTT. This spatial feature takes the 
number of different ASNs and number of IPs return in single 
DNS response in their calculations. However, this two 
detection features evaded by the botmaster, as botmaster is 
controlling the returned list of IPS that the user receives. 
Which the returned list could has that IPs in the same ASN or 
adjacent the user ASN, so the above measures can inaccurately 
classify the benign and flux domains. On the other hand, 
botmaster may return a list contains just a single IP address, 
which leads to ineffective detection of the domains[17, 18]. 
Although genetic algorithms provide good accuracy, but they 
are very complex and take noteworthy time in building data 
models. Also, the linear decision function used as classifier 
needs to estimate the categorizer of the linear function, so if 
the estimation is good then the linear function work properly, 
otherwise the error will be high in the classification process 
[19]. 
 
Fig.2 The overall detection accuracy 
   On the other hand, the second compared algorithm is the C4.5 
as proposed in [20]. A number of feature sets were examined to 
detect fast flux network, such feature set consist of timing based, 
spatial based, network-based domain based, and DNS answer 
based feature sets. As mentioned in the literature the data set was 
small even the accuracy of the experiment is high, also when all 
features are involved in the experiment the prediction results 
become insensitive to two features (timing and domain-based 
feature sets) [18]. Besides, as C4.5 algorithm considered as a 
supervised learning algorithm, it could not be used to discover 
the unknown attacks especially the zero-day fast flux domains.  
   For the second experiment, a public dataset was used; IRIS 
dataset has non-leaner separable attributes. Experiments of 3-
fold cross-validation datasets were done and then the average 
was taken to present the results shown in the table 3 and Fig 3 
below: 
 
Fig.3 Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F-measure of ADeSNN 
TABLE 3 EXPERMENT RESULTS 
Measures Rates 
FNR 0.0625 
FPR 0.1071 
TPR 0.9375 
TNR 0.8929 
AUC 0.9152 
 
   For the sake of space, the comparison between the DeSNN and 
the ADeSNN is omitted, and a short comparison was made. The 
overall accuracy of DeSNN was 56.0 while it was 91.67 for 
ADeSNN, and the other measures were depicted in fig 3, 
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according to the IRIS dataset two classes were non-linearly 
separable which case to show almost 91% accuracy while it was 
tested on the first linearly separable classes and give 100% 
accuracy. This leads to the ability of the adaptive DeSNN to 
classify classes even when inputs are mutually mixed. The 
algorithm of the DeSNN suffers from many parameters needed 
to be set before running the algorithm, so one of the future work 
should take into account to minimize the number of the 
parameters to be set. Our adaptive DeSNN modifies the process 
of the initial weight setting, so this adaptation added a value in 
the parameters customization problem by excluded the (Mod) 
parameter. 
VII. CONCLUSION   
   A botnet, a set of compromised machines controlled distantly 
by an attacker, is the basis of numerous security threats around 
the world. Command and Control servers are the backbones of 
botnet communications, where the bots and botmaster send 
report and attack orders to each other. Fast-Flux Service 
Network (FFSN) – a special type of botnet – has been engaged 
by bot herders to cover malicious botnet activities and increase 
the lifetime of malicious servers by quickly changing the IP 
addresses of the domain name over time. Although several 
methods have been suggested for detecting FFSNs, they have 
low detection accuracy especially with the zero-day domain, 
quite a long detection time and consume high memory storage. 
In this research, we propose a new system called Fast Flux Killer 
System (FFKS) that has the ability to detect FF-Domains in 
online mode with an implementation constructed on Adaptive 
Dynamic evolving Spiking Neural Network (ADeSNN). The 
proposed system proved to detect fast flux domains with high 
detection accuracy according to the experiments, a comparison 
was conducted with two related work in the same area and the 
results were excellent. Also, the adaptive DeSNN showed an 
enhancement in its classification performance regarding the 
experiment done on the public dataset.  Besides, the adaptive 
algorithm contributed to the parameters customization problem 
as mentioned before. 
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